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One hundred years after adoption of the fourteenth amendment, forty-four 
years after all native-born American Indians were declared to be citizens of the 
United States,1 and eleven years after The Constitution followed the flag over-
seas,2 the Bill of Rights finally came to Indian reservations. 
Title II of the 1968 Civil Rights Act3 provides, in substance, that no 
Indian tribe in exercising its powers of local self-government^" may engage in 
action, with certain important exceptions, which the federal or state govern-
ments are prohibited from undertaking by the first ten and fourteenth amend-
ments to the Constitution. Significantly, the legislative forerunner of Title 
II, as originally drafted, would have required that "any Indian tribe in exer-
cising the powers of local self-government shall be subject to (exactly) the 
same limitations and restraints as those which are imposed on the Government of 
the United States by the United States Constitution.In response to testi-
mony that such general language could cause a host of legal and practical 
problems in the administration of justice on Indian reservations," and at the 
suggestion of the Department of the Interior,7 the proposed legislation was 
rewritten in order to select and specify the constitutional protection. „ 
American Indians were to possess in their relations with tribal governments. 
The idea that Congress in 1968 had to bring the Bill of Rights to Indian 
reservations by statute, and that Congress could pick and choose which consti-
tutional safeguards to extend, is alien to popular concepts of American juris-
prudence. Before examining the historical and legal precedents which led to 
this anomaly, a brief review of how Title II compares with the first ten 
amendments would seem in order. 
Section 202(1) of the 1968 Civil Rights Act provides that no Indian tribe9 
shall "make or enforce any law prohibiting the free exercise of religion, or 
abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press, or the right of the people 
peaceably to assemble and to petition for a redress of grievances." This 
language, of course is taken virtually word for word from the first amendment, 
with the omission of the clause prohibiting "establishment of religion." 
Deletion of the establishment clause was deliberate, in recognition of the 
theocratic nature of many tribal governments.10 
Section 202 (2) paraphrases the fourth amendment by requiring that Indian 
tribes shall not "violate the right of the people to be secure in their persons, 
houses, papers, and effects against unreasonable search and seizure, nor issue 
warrents, but upon probable cause, supported by oath or affirmation, and partic-
ularly describing the place to be searched and the person or thing to be seized." 
Perhaps mindful of the nineteenth century Sioux and Apache compaigns, Congress 
in Title II did not restate the second amendment right of the Indian people to 
keep :id bear arms. 
Section 202 (3) - (5), inclusive, make applicable to Indian tribes the re-
straints upon double jeopardy, self-incrimination and the taking of private 
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property without payment of just compensation respectively, imposed upon the 
federal and state governments by the fifth and fourteenth amendments. The fifth 
amendment right to indictment by a grand jury in capital cases, on the other 
hand, is omitted in view of the limited criminal jurisdiction of tribal courts. 
Section 202 (6) provides that no Indian tribe shall "deny to any person in 
a criminal proceeding the right to a speedy and public trial, to be informed of 
the nature and the cause of the accusation, to be confronted with the witness 
against him, to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, 
and at his own expense to have the assistance of counsel for his defense." This 
language is taken virtually word for word from the sixth amendment, with the 
omission of the right to trial "by an impartial jury," which is covered under 
section 202 (10), and the addition of the qualification that an Indian criminal 
defendant in tribal court has a right to counsel only "at his own expense." In 
commenting upon the latter limitation on a civil right of growing prominence,H 
the Justice Department explained:12 
The fact that this is a departure from recent United States case 
law requiring free counsel for indigents does not necessarily mean 
it is repugnant to modern judicial standards when viewed in the con-
text of Indian court practices. In most Indian tribes there is no 
organized bar association. Thus, attorneys are not generally avail-
able to represent defendants. In addition, the prosecution in tribal 
courts is often informal and may be presented without the assistance 
of professional attorneys. Finally, the tribal cases generally deal 
with traditional and customary law where the exercise of trained 
counsel is not essential. 
Section 202 (7) ordains that Indian tribes shall not "require excessive bail, 
impose excessive fines, inflict cruel and unusual punishments, and in no event 
impose for conviction of any one offense any penalty or punishment greater than 
imprisonment for a tern of six months or a fine of $500, or both." The first 
part of this text obviously is taken from the eighth amendment, while the 
latter part essentially codifies existing practice under the various tribal 
law and order codes. Section 202 (9) carries over to Indian tribes the pro-
hibition in article I, section 10, against passage by Congress of any bill of 
attainder or ex post facto law. 
Section 202 (10) provides that no Indian tribe shall "deny to any person 
accused of an offense punishable by imprisonment the right, upon request, to a 
trial by jury of not less than six persons." This modification of the sixth 
amendment right to trial by a twelve-man jury in criminal cases was deemed 
appropriate in light of the relatively informal nature of tribal court pro-
ceedings, while the omission of the seventh amendment right to a trial by jury 
in civil cases at common law where the value in controversy exceeds $20 also 
permits continued flexibility in the tribal court systems. ^ 
Section 202 (8), reflecting the fourteenth amendment, directs that no Indian 
tribe shall "deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of 
its laws," and reflecting the fifth amendment, further directs that Indian 
tribes shall not "deprive any person of liberty or property without due process 
of law." Section 203, reflecting article I, section 9> provides that the 
"privilege of the writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a 
court of the United States, to test the legality of his detention by order of 
an Indian tribe." As the following discussion will show, section 202 (8) and 
203 undoubtedly will have a greater impact upon the operations of tribal govern-
ments, and are more likely to be the subject or basis of future litigation, 
than any of the other provisions of Title II. 
BL2C-3 
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TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS BEFORE TITLE II 
From the earliest days of our Nation, Indian tribes have been recognized, 
in the words of Chief Justice Marshall, as "distinct, independent, political ' 
corxiunities,and, as such, authorized to exercise powers of local self-govern-
ment. In a more recent restatement of the controlling rule of law, the Supreme 
Court of Arizona observed: 
The whole course of judicial decision on the nature of Indian tribal 
powers is marked by adherence to three fundamental principles; (l) An 
Indian tribe possesses, in the first instance, all the powers of any 
sovereign state. (2) Conquest renders the tribe subject to the legislative 
power of the United States and, in substance, terminates the external 
powers of sovereignty of the tribe, e.g., its power to enter into 
treaties with foreign nations, but does not by itself affect the in-
ternal sovereignty of the tribe, i.e., its powers of local self-govern-
ment. (3) These powers are subject to qualification by treaties and 
by express legislation of Congress, but, save as thus expressly 
qualified, full powers of internal sovereignty are vested in the Indian 
tribes and in their duly constituted organs of government. 15 
A striking affirmation of the foregoing principles in particular relation 
to the Bill of Rights is found in the case of Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 
(1896). The question there presented was whether a law of the Cherokee Nation 
authorizing a jury of five persons to constitute criminal proceedings violated 
the fifth amendment requirement of indictment by a grand jury. The Supreme 
Court held that the fifth amendment applies only to the acts of the federal 
government, that the sovereign powers of the Cherokee Nation, although re-
cognized by the United States, were not created by the United States, and that 
the judicial authority of the Cherokees was, therefore, not subject to the 
limitations imposed by the fifth amendment. 
The Talton holding actually stands only for the proposition that a tribal 
government, absent any federal action, is not required to grant Indians a 
remedial right - a right concerning the form and manner in which the power of 
government is exercised - conferred by the Constitution.!" Left open by the 
holding, and never decided by the Supreme Court, was whether a tribal govern-
ment, again absent any federal action, may deny its members a fundamental 
right - an inviolable and personal liberty - under the Constitution, such as 
freedom of religion.17 The lower federal courts, though, in a series of de-
cisions withholding basic Bill of Rights protections, eventually filled that gap. 
In Martinez v. Southern Ute Tribe of Souther Ute Res., 2l+9 F. 2d 915 (10th 
Fir. 1957), cert, denied, 356 U.S. 9<$0 (1958), for example, the court ruled that 
the due process clause did not apply to the acts of an Indian tribe in denying 
an individual Indian the benefits of tribal membership. In Barta v. Oglala 
Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Reservation, 259 F. 2d 553 (8th Cir. 1958), cert. 
Denied, 358 U.S. 932 (1959), the court ruled that neither the due process 
clause of the fifth amendment nor the equal protection clause of the fourteenth 
amendment applied to the act of an Indian tribe in imposing a tax only on non-
members for the use of Indian trust lands. In Native American Church v. Navajo 
Tribal Council, 272 F. 2d 131 (10th Cir. 1959), the court ruled in rejecting a 
first amendment attack upon a criminal conviction under tribal law for the 
ritual use of peyote.l^ 
The First Amendment applies only to Congress. It limits the powers 
of Congress to interfere with religious freedom or religious worship. 
61X3 
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It is made applicable-to the States only by the Fourteenth Amendment. 
Thus construed, the First Amendment places limitations upon the 
action of Congress and of the States. But as declared in the de-
cisions hereinbefore discussed, Indian tribes are not states. They 
have a status higher than that of states. They are subordinate and 
dependent nations possessed of all powers as such only to the extent 
that they have expressly been required to surrender them by the superior 
sovereign, the United States. The Constitution is, of course, the 
supreme law of the land, but it is nonetheless a part of the laws of 
the United States. Under the philosophy of the decisions, it, as any 
other law, is binding upon Indian nations only where it expressly binds 
them, or is made binding by treaty or some act of Congress. No provi-
sion in the Constitution makes the First Amendment applicable to 
Indian nations nor is there any law of Congress doing so. ^  
The doctrine that Indian tribes are not federal instrumentalities for 
purposes of invoking the Bill of Rights or states within the meaning of the 
fourteenth amendment also has found expression in the district courts. Thus 
in United States v. Seneca Nation of New York Indians, 27I+ F. 9k-6 (W.D.N.Y. 
1921), the court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction a claim based upon the 
alleged unlawful taking of private property by a tribal government. Glover v. 
United States, 219 F. Sapp. 19 (D.Mont. 1963), held that a criminal defendent 
in tribal court has no right to counsel under the sixth amendment. A non-
Indian doing business on, but evicted from, an Indian reservation was denied 
protection under the fourteenth amendment. United States v. Blackfeet Tribal 
Court, 2b\ F. Supp. VfU (D. Mont. 1965). And, in a frequently noted case, 
Toledo v. Pueblo Jemez,20 a suit under the old Civil Rights Act, 8 U.S.C. U3, 
by a Protestant minority, refused the right to build a church or use a tribal 
cementery, was dismissed on the ground that the conduct of an Indian tribe is 
not State action. 
Notwithstanding its firm foundation in legal and historical precedents, 
however, the continuing vitality of the Talton rule was by no means assured in 
this era of changing constitutional interpretation.21 The more often claimed 
violations of fundamental rights were litigated, the more likely some court 
would find a rationale for holding Indian tribes subject to the Bill of Rights -
and finally one did. In Colliflower v. Garland, 3^4-2 F. 2d 369 (19^5), the 
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, on the newly stated premise that tribal 
courts "function in part as a federal agency," held that the District Court 
had jurisdiction "in a habeas corpus proceeding to inquire into the lagality of 
the detention of an Indian pursuant to an order of an Indian c o u r t . " 2 2 
The Colliflower decision required fancy judicial footwork.23 Although the 
ruling expressly was confined "to the courts of the Fort Belknap reservation,"2^ 
no meaningful difference really exists between the Fort Felknap Tribal Court 
and, as one example, the Oglala Sioux Tribal Court which the Court of Appeals 
for the Eighth Circuit found not to be a federal instrumentality in Iron Crow 
v. Oglala Sioux Tribe of Pine Ridge Res., 231 F. 2d 89, 9*4-98 (1956).25 
Moreover, although passing reference was made to a possible distinction between 
fundamental and remedial rights under the Constitution,26 the Ninth Circuit 
established no standards for determining which constitutional restrictions 
should apply to tribal courts and, indeed, affirmatively indicated that the 
fourteenth amendment might not apply at all.27 What emerges from a close 
reading of Colliflower, therefore, is not a cohesive new theory of constitu-
tional law, but rather the distinct impression that the Court of Appeals found 
a gross injustice to have been perpetrated2° and simply decided to stop it. 29 
MX 3 
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In addition to judicial concern, Congress and the executive agencies, and 
that fourth "branch of government, the private foundation, devoted ever-increasing 
attention through the 1960's to controlling possible violations of constitutional 
rights in the operations of Indian tribes. Whereas a Special Task Force on 
Indian Affairs in 1961 recommended to the Secretary of the Interior only that 
tribes be encouraged to protect civil liberties by their own ordinances. 30 
President Lyndon Johnson urged Congress in 1968 to enact statutory Indian Bill 
of Rights.31 A Commission on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of 
the American Indian, established by the Fund for the Republic, in 1961 declared 
that the immunity of Indian governments from Bill of Rights restraints jeopar-
dizes "the very assumptions on which our free society was established."32 Most 
important, beginning in 1961 the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights 
began the public hearings33 which ultimately led to the inclusion of Title II in 
the 1968 Civil Rights Act. 
TRIBAL SOVEREIGNTY AND THE BILL OF RIGHTS -
AN ATTEMPTED RECONCILIATION 
In their relations with the federal and state governments, Indians are 
entitled to the same rights, privileges and immunities as many other citizens. 
As the cases previously cited would indicate, however, the Senate Subcommittee 
on Constitutional Rights confirmed during the course of its hearings that 
Indians in their relation with tribal governments are not always accorded those 
same rights and privileges and immunities35 -- a situation the Subcommittee 
members found intolerable. Congress, unlike the courts, had. clear cut authority 
to make constitutional protections applicable to Indian tribes.3° and the ulti-
mate question presented to the Subcommittee, therefore, was not whether to act, 
but rather how far and how fast to proceed. Consistent with the long history 
of dealings between the United States and Indian tribes, any extension of the 
Bill of Rights to Indian Reservations, in order to become practically as well 
as legally effective, would require agreement from the Indians, and such con-
sent in turn required respect for tribal sovereignty. 
For Indians, tribal sovereignty is not an abstract concept, a cultural 
relic, or even a vanishing institution. On their reservations, the tribe re-
presents to its members not only the local government,37 but also a dominant 
force in their economic and social lives. Indeed, in 193*+, after pursuing a 
contrary policy for generations, Congress itself recognized that strong, inde-
pendent tribal organizations are fundamental to reservation development (for 
humans as well as natural resources), ..nd granted to the tribes new powers in 
the management of their political and business affairs.3° Moreover, through 
the years, tribal institutions, including the tribal courts, though handicapped 
by lack of funds and experience, 39 have worked unusually well in protecting the 
rights and promoting the interests of the Indian people. Small wonder, there-
fore, that Indians could be expected to resist any change in the law, no matter 
how attractive otherwise, which threatened the underlying powers or independence 
of tribal governments. 
The legislative history of Title II makes clear that Congress viewed ex-
tension of the Bill of Rights to Indian reservations as a tool for strengthening 
tribal institutions and organizations, not as a weapon for their destruction.^0 
The omission of the first amendment establishment clause, in deference to the 
theocratic nature of some Indian tribal governments, and the limitations placed 
upon a criminal defendent's right to counsel, in deference to the unmanageable 
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administrative burdens an absolute right to counsel would place upon tribal 
court systems, already have been mentioned. In addition, although the subcommittee 
staff urgently recommended in 1966 that individual Indians be granted a right of 
appeal from an adverse decision in a tribal court and a trial de novo in the 
federal district court in criminal cases where a denial of constitutional rights 
may have occurred,and although the bill which untimately, became Title II 
contained such language when originally introduced in 1967, the appellate 
provisions of the legislation were completely eliminated before S. 181+3 was 
reported by the Senate Committee on the Judiciary. ^"3 Again, the Subcommittee 
agreed to delete a proposed, new legal safeguard - even one strongly endorsed 
by its Chairman^ - on the ground that an appeal and trial de novo in federal 
court would cause too serious a disruption of tribal self-government. 
A Congressional intent to preserve tribal sovereignty under the 1968 Civil 
Rights Act is vividly illustrated by the provisions of Title IV. In 1953, when 
the most serious effort in modern times to terminate the special relationship 
between the federal government and Indian tribes was reaching its peak, Congress 
passed an act^5 which authorized a number of western states, not previously 
possessed of that right, unilaterally to amend their constitutions or statutes 
in order to extend state civil or criminal jurisdiction. In response to fifteen 
years of Indian protests against this ever-present threat to their powers of 
local self-government, Title IV amends the 1953 Act to require "the consent of 
the Indian tribe occupying the particular Indian country or part thereof which 
could be affected by such assumption" before any extension of state jurisdiction 
would become operative. 
The legal background, legislative history and actual text of the 1968 Civil 
Rights Act thus show that Congress there intended affirmatively and sensitively 
to reconcile application of the Bill of Rights on Indian reservations with con-
tinued control by Indians over their own affairs.^" In attempting this recon-
ciliation, Congress undertook to solve a legal problem which, realistically, 
the courts appeared ill-equipped to handle. Specifically, given current trends 
of judicial decision, the exclusion of reservation Indians from the enjoyment 
of many rights conferred by the Constitution was not likely much longer to 
endure. At the same time, however, applying every limitation in the Bill of 
Rights to the acts of Indian tribes could destroy tribal self-government, while 
the economic and social advancement of reservation Indians clearly is tied to 
the maintenance of strong tribal institutions. In a way which the courts might 
not have found possible, Congress in the 1968 Civil Rights Act sought to balance 
these interests - freedom for the individual, yet respect for tribal sovereignty. 
The measure of its initial success is evident in the almost unanimous support 
which Indians gave Title II, notwithstanding the trepidation with which they 
had viewed earlier versions of the same legislation. ^ 7 
FUTURE ENFORCEMENT OF TITLE II 
lift 
Title II has not yet been judicially construed. 0 As in the case of con-
stitutional rights generally, the Indian Bill of Rights presents a limitless 
potential for litigation. Even in the absence of guiding precedents, however, 
some conclusions reasonably may be reached in answer to the two key questions: 
how far do the rights created by the statute extend, and in what court can 
those rights be enforced? 
1. Forum: With respect to the review of criminal proceedings in tribal 
courts, section 203 of Title II expressly provides that the privilege of the 
writ of habeas corpus shall be available to any person, in a court of the United 
6 W 
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States, to test the "legality of his detention" hy order of an Indian tribe. 
Although the statute speaks only in terns of "detention," the federal district 
courts in all likelihood will (and should) extend their habeas corpus review 
of criminal convictions in tribal courts to include cases where the defendant 
is released 011 probation, which still involves restraint upon his person, or 
where the defendant merely is fined, which usually is an alternative to, or sub-
stitute for, actual imprisonment.50 Furthermore, although the term "legality" 
is not defined, the only interpretation of that word consistent with the pur-
poses of the statute would be that the federal district courts are authorized to 
inquire into the question of whether a defendant's rights under section 202 may 
have been violated, but are not authorized, to inquire into whether he may have 
been denied some other right under either the Constitution or tribal law. Even 
as so limited, section 203 provides ample opportunity for the federal courts to 
insure that tribal criminal proceedings are basically fair and that the const-
tutional rights of Indian criminal defendants, as specified by Congress, are fully 
protected. 
Title II, of course, does not provide for an appeal to the federal courts 
or other review of decisions by tribal courts in civil cases. More important, 
the 1968 Act does not designate any court in which the legality of tribal 
executive or legislative action, which allegedly conflicts with the Bill of 
Rights, can be tested. In the absence of a statutory direction, the choice of 
the appropriate forum for an adjudication of these rights is further complicated 
by the well-settled rule that Indian tribes enjoy sovereign immunity from suit, 
which may not be waived without the consent of Congress.51 
Where executive or legislative activities are subject to Secretarial review -
as frequently is the case under tribal constitutions, particularly with respect 
to the management of trust lands and the expenditure of trust funds - the Sec-
retary of the Interior will have the power, which an aggrieved party by appeal 
may request that he invoke, 52 to determine whether such tribal action is in 
accordance with Title II, and his determination can be reviewed in the federal 
courts pursuant to the Administrative Procedure Act.53 where tribal executive 
or legislative activities are not subject to Secretarial review, as generally 
is the case with respect to political affairs, the logical forum for testing 
the validity of such tribal action is the tribal court.5^ As noted above, how-
ever, no appeal is available to the federal or state courts in the event the 
tribal court refuses to take jurisdiction over the dispute. 
Assuming the formidable sovereign imminity jurdle can be overcome,55 a suit 
to enforce rights recognized and protected under Title II probably will lie in 
the state court of general jurisdiction where the state possesses jurisdiction 
on Indian reservations in accordance with Public Law 280 of the 83rd Congress, 
and in the federal district court, where the amount in controversy exceeds 
$10,000.57 The bulk of all civil cases arising on Indian reservations in which 
a violation of section 202 rights is alleged, though, will not fall within 
either of these categories. 58 The conclusion, necessarily follows that, at least 
in some classes of cases, Title II may have provided a right without an effective 
remedy. 
2. Substantive Law: Passage of the 1968 Civil Rights Act undoubtedly has 
postponed the day when the Supreme Court must decide whether Talton v. Mayes, 
supra, still is good law. 59 Assuming (as the cases so far hold.) that the prin-
ciples of Talton and derivative decisions remain controlling, and thus that 
Congress has the power to select which Bill of Rights protections shall apply to 
the acts of Indian tribes, the central substantive issue that the courts now 
will face is whether Title II should be strictly or liberally construed. 
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The historical and legal background of Title II, as well as the manifest 
Congressional intent in the 1968 Act to preserve, if not enhance, tribal 
sovereignty, all point to a strict construction of its language. 
Section 202 (6), for example, provides that a criminal defendant in tribal 
court shall have the right "at his own expense" to have the assistance of counsel 
for his defense. This right to counsel logically extends to attorneys who are 
willing to serve at no cost to the defendant because he is poor. The legisla-
tive history of Title II makes clear, on the other hand, that the tribal court 
has no statutory obligation to appoint counsel for an indigent defendant,^0 
and any judicial extension of the right to counsel to impose such a burden upon 
the tribal court would seem wholly unwarranted.6l Similarly, under the doctrine 
of expression unius est exclusio alterius, a party to a civil suit in tribal 
court apparently is not entitled as a matter of right to the assistance of a 
professional attorney of his own choice. 
The requirements of section 202 (8) that an Indian tribe not "deny to any 
person within its jurisdiction^ the equal protection of its laws or deprive 
any person of liberty or property without due process of law" pose more difficult 
problems of statutory interpretations. Here again, in order to carry out the 
twin purposes of the 1968 Act - protection for the individual, yet respect for 
tribal sovereignty - the courts properly should exercise restraint before strik-
ing down long-standing tribal practices which reasonably can be justified. Thus, 
under Title II, a continuing violation of the "one man, one vote" principle61+ 
in a tribal election code probably could and should be subject to judicial 
correction. The Iroquois custom that tribal membership and inheritance rights 
with respect to land descend only through the female line, on the other hand, 
is not so repugnant J;o ordinary standards of fair play as to dictate its aboli-
tion by the courts. 5 Moreover, to cite other examples in the field of economic 
regulation, ample factual justification exists for sustaining even as against a 
due process or equal protection attack the right of a tribe to grant its members 
preference in the allocation of reservation grazing privileges or to assess a 
tax only upon non-members doing business on the reservation."" 
In the final analysis, though, how the courts will construe Title II and, 
in the particular, section 202 (8) is a story yet to be told. Perhaps the 
safest conclusion is that, over the years, the 1968 Civil Rights Act will prove 
another landmark statute both in the protection of individual rights and in 
the progressive development of tribal resources and institutions. 
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1. Act of June 2, 192b, U3 Stat. 253, now codified in 8 U.S.C. 1*4-01 (a) (2) 
(1964). Prior to the Citizenship Act of 1924, approximately two-thirds of 
the Indians of the United States already had acquired citizenship by treaty 
or statute. U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law, 517-520 (1958) 
derived from F. Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law (G.P.O. 4th ed., 1945). 
2. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Kinsella v. United States ex rel. Single-
ton, 6l (i960). 
3. Act of A pril 11, 1968, Sess. 2 Stat. 77, 25 U.SC. 1301-1303. 
4. In section 201 (2) of the 1968 Act, "powers of self-government" are defined 
to mean and include "all governmental powers possessed by an Indian tribe, 
executive, legislative and judicial, and all offices, bodies and tribunals 
by and through which they are created including courts of Indian offensesj 
5. S. 961 of the 89th Congress, reprinted in Hearings on S. 961 etc. Before the 
Sub-Committee on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 
89th Congress, 1st Session, (1965) (hereinafter cited as Hearings). 
6. Hearings at 16, 64-65, 130-131, and elsewhere. As summarized in Staff of Sub-
comm. Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 89th Cong., 
2nd Session. Summary Report of Hearings and Investigations on the Constitu-
tional Rights of the American Indian 9 (Comm. Print 1966) (hereinafter cited 
as Sunnary Report). 
The most serious objections to S. 961 took the form neither of objection 
to the purposes of the bill not quarrel with the sundry allegations of 
the practice of (sic) possibility of denial of rights by tribal govern-
ments. Instead, as numberous witnesses pointed out, the pecularities 
of the Indian's economic and social condition, his customs, his beliefs, 
and. his attitudes raised serious questions about the desirability of 
imposing upon Indian cultures : ' the legal forms and procedures to which 
other Americans had become long accustomed. 
7. Hearings at 317-319• 
8. Summary Report at 25. The revised bill was introduced as S. 1843 of the 
Congress on May 23, 1967. 113 Cong. Rec. S 7214 (daily ed. May 23, 1967). 
S. 1843 consequently was combined with other bills affecting Indians under 
consideration by the committee on Constitutional Rights, and as so amended, 
was favorably reported on December 6, 1967, by the Senate Committee on the 
Judiciary, S. Rep. No. 84l, Protection the Rights of the American Indian, 
90th Congress 1st Sess (1967) (hereinafter cited as Senate Report). The 
Senate passed the bill by unanimous vote on December 7, 1967 Cong. Rec. 
S. 18156 daily ed. Dec. 7, 1967) but the House Committee on Interior and 
Insular Affairs, to which S. 1843 was referred took no action to move the 
legislation. 
OA March 8, 1968 Senator Sam J. Irvin, Jr. (D., N.C.)Chairman of the Senate 
Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights, offered the complete final text of S. 
1843 an amendment to H.R. 2516, the House-passed civil rights bill, and, 
after some procedural debate as to whether the proposal was germane under the 
cloture rule than in force, the Senate approved the amendment by a vote of 
81-0, 114 Cong. Rec. S 2*4-59 et seq. ed. March 8, 1968). A few days later, 
the Senate passed H.R. 2516 which was referred for consideration back to 
the House of Representatives and ultimately was approved with further amend-
ment. Ilk Cong. Rec. H 2825-2826 (daily ed. April 10, 1968). 
The Story of how the Indian Bill of Rights, apparently blocked from pas-
sage on its own merits in the House of Representatives, became law as part 
of the 1968 Civil Rights Act is a subject worthy of the political scientest--
a fascinating tale in the fine art of legislative strategy. 
9. An Indian tribe is defined in section 201 (l) to mean "any tribe, band or 
other group of Indians subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and 
recognized as possessing powers of self-government." 
l\QC3 
FOOTNOTES ii 
10. Report of the Department of Justice on S. 18)4.3, dated March 29, 1968, 
printed to He^ 'itigs on H.R. 15*4-19 and Related Bills Before the Subcomm. 
on Indi»« Affairs of the House Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs, 90th 
2nd Sess. 26 (1968), (hereinafter cited as House Hearings), see 
Statement on H.T. 2516 by Congressman Ben Reifel (R., S.D.)--the only member 
of Congress also enrolled as a member of an Indian tribe before the House 
Committee on Rules, published as an Extension of Remarks of Congressman 
Ray J. Madden (D., Ind.) (hereinafter cited as Reifel Statement), 11*4- Cong. 
Ray E. 27*4-1-27*4-2 (daily ed. April 1968). 
11. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Escobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 
478 (1964) Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). 
12. House Hearings at 26-27; see Remarks of Interior Department Solicitor 
Edward Weinberg before the Indian Law Committee, Federal Bar Association 
£-3 (Sept. 13, 1968) (unpublished): 
If the right to professional counsel without charge were construed 
as applicable to criminal proceedings in tribal courts, such courts 
would practically have to cease functioning because they have no bars 
of professional lawyers associated with them from which they could 
appoint counsel to present indigent defendants. Hence, the right to 
professional counsel guaranteed by the Indian Bill of Rights is 
conditional upon the defendant's providing such counsel for himself 
As a general rule, professional attorneys have not heretofore been 
permitted to practice in tribal courts. Justice, U.S. Comm. on Civil 
Rights Report No. 5 145 (l96l) (hereinafter cited as Civil Rights 
Report). The regulation preventing attorneys from appearing in Courts 
Of Indian Offenses under the control of the Secretary of the Interior, 
however, was revoked on May 16, 1961. 25 C.F.R. 11.9• 
13. House Hearings at 27. 
14. Worcester v. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832) 
15. Begay v. Miller, 70 Ariz. 380,222P. 2d 624, 627 (1950) quoting from F. 
Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law, supra note 1 at 123; see Iron Crow 
v. Oglala Sioux 1-31, F. 2d 89, 92-93 (8th Cir. 1956). 
16. The Talton decision is correctly cited in the Edgewood, 279 F. 348 (3rd Cir. 
1922). In support of the principle that presentment by a grand jury is not 
a fundamental constitutional right. See Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197 
(1903), and Soto v. United States, F. 628, 633 (3rd Cir. 1921). 
17. The flat prohibition against slavery in the thirteenth amendment has been 
held applicable to Indian tribes. In re Sah Quah, 31 F. 327 (D. Alas 1886). 
18. Forty years ago, the validity of a State anti-peyote ordinance was upheld, 
State v. Big Sheep,75 Mont. 219, 243 P. IO67 (1926). More recently, State 
prosecution of members of the Native American Church for the use of or 
possession of peyote outside a reservation uniformly have been dismissed on 
first amendment grounds. People v. Wood 6l Cal. 2d 889, 394 P. 2d. 813, 
40 Cal. Rptr. 69, (1964): Arizona v. Attakai, Criminal No. 4098, Conconino 
City, (i960); Colorado v. Pardeahtan, Criminal Action No. 9454, Denver City 
(I967O; Texas v. Clark, Criminal Action No. 12, 879, Webb Cty. (1968). 
19. 272 F. 2d at 134-135. A stated by the court (272 F. 2d. at 132), the 
Native American Church case also involved a claim of illegal search and 
seizure under the fourth amendment, but this argument is not discussed in 
the opinion. 
20. 119 F. Supp. 429. (D.N.M. 1954); see: 7 Stan. L. Rev. 285 (1955), the 
Constitutional Rights of the American Tribal Indian, 51 Va. L. Rev. 121, 
132 1956; 51 Iowa L. Rev. 665 n. 79 (l966). 
21. Actually, spadework for the burial of Talton already had started. In Elk v. 
Wilkins, U.S. 94 (1884), a relatively contemporaneous case, the Supreme 
Court declared that: in general acts of Congress did not apply to Indians, 
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unless so expressed as to clearly manifest an intention to include them" 
112 U.S. at 100. The Supreme Court though this statement from Elk in Federal 
Power Comm'n v. Tuscarora Indian Nation, U.S. 99 (i960) at 116, and, as the 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit observed, Elk vs. 
Wilkins, "whatever its present day significance, certainly does not to 
"remove Indians and their property intersts" from the coverage of a general 
statute. Navajo Tribe v. NLEB, 288 F. 2d 162, 165 n. 4 (D.D.C. 1961) cert, 
denied, 366 (l§6l). The death of Elk clearly signaled the ultimate demise 
of Talton. 
22. Colliflower v. Garland, 342 F. 2d. 369, 379 (9th Circ. 1965). 
23. The opinion was both criticized (79 Harv. L. Rev. 436 (1965), and praised 
(26 L. Rev. 235 (196 ). 
24. Supra note 22, at 379. 
25. To the same general effect with respect to the Navajo Tribal Court is Oliver 
v. Udall, 306 F. 2d 819 (D.C. Cir. 1962), cert, denied, 372 U.S. 908 (1963). 
342 F. 2d. at 379,referring to the so-called "Insular Cases": Hawaii v. 
Supra note l6; Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 2kk (1901); Door v. United States 
138 (1904); and Talton v. Mayes. Whether the fundamental-remedial right dis-
tinction established in the Insular Cases would be extended to cases in-
volving tribal sovereighnity is our judgment that neither the cases nor their 
reasoning should be given any further expansion." Reid v. Convert, supra note 
2 at Ik. 
27. Supra note 22, at 379-
28. As stated by the court (342 F. 2d at 370-371), the record seems clearly to 
support Mrs. Colliflower's claim that she was not afforded the right to 
counsel, was not confronted by any witnesses against her, and for all 
practical purposes, was not afforded a trial. 
29. The district court, on remand, took the hint, Citing only the court of 
appeals decision as as authority, and after a brief statement of the facts, 
Judgement Jameson concluded: "That there was a lack of due process under 
the fifth amendment," granted petition motion for summary judgment, and dis-
charged Mrs. Colliflower from custody. Colliflower v. Garland, Civil No. 
2klk (D. Font., Aug. 19, 1965). 
30. Report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian Affairs, 
(July 10, 1961). 
31- House Hearings at 2k. 
32. Comm. on the Rights, Liberties, and Responsibilities of the American Indian, 
A Program for Indian Citizens 2k (1961), expanded and restated in W. Brophy 
& Aberle, The Indian: America's Unfinished Business (1966). 
33- The complete history of these hearings is summarized in the Senate Report, 
supra note 8, at 5 as follows; 
In 1961, the subcommittee began its preliminary investigation of the 
legal status of the Indian in America and the problems Indians en-
counter when asserting constitutional rights in their relations with 
State, Federal and tribal governments. Approximately 2, 000 question-
naires, addressed to a broadly representative group of persons fam-
iliar with Indian Affairs, comprised an important segment of this 
investigation. The preliminary research, the first such study ever 
undertaken by Congress, demonstrated a clear need for further cong-
ressional inquiry. Accordingly, hearings were commenced in Washing-
ton in August 1961, and moved to California, Arizona, and New Mexico 
in November. The following June, hearings were held in Colorado and 
. North and South Dakota and finally concluded in Washington during 
March of 1963. These hearings and staff conferences were held in areas 
where the sub-committee could receive the views of the largest number 
of Indian tribes. During this period, representatives from 85 tribes 
appeared before the subcommittee. 
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S 961 through S. 968 and Joint Resolution 1+0 of the 89th Congress 
were introduced in response to findings of the subcommittee based on 
these hearings and investigations. 
On June 22, 23, 2k, and 29, 19&5, subcommittee, meeting in 
Washington, received testimony relative to these measures. Additional 
statements were filed with the committee before eud following the 
public hearings. In all, some 79 persons either appeared before the 
subcommittee or presented statements for its consideration. These per-
sons included representatives from 36 separate tribes, bands or other 
groups located in 14 States. Four national associations representing 
Indians, as well as three regional, federated Indian organizations, 
presented their views. Members of Congress, State officials, and repre-
sentatives from the Department of the Interior also submitted opinions 
on this legislation. 
The 1965 hearings revealed the necessity of revising some of the 
original measures, combining two of them into title I, and deleting 
two proposals from the legislative package. The six titles of S. 181+3, 
as amended, are products of the recommendations of the Subcommittee on 
Constitutional Rights as reported in its "Summary Report on Hearings 
and Investigations on the Constitutional Rights of the American Indian, 1966. 
34. U.S. Const, amend. XIV, 1: Montoya v. Bolack, 70 N.M. 196,372 P. 2d 387 
(1962); Garrison v. Laveen, 67 Ariz. 337, 196 P. 2d 456 (1948); Senate 
Report at f; Civil Rights, Supra note 12, at 131-132, l6o. 
35- Senate Report at 6-9; Summary Report, supra note 6, at 3 
36. United States v. Kagama, 118 U.S. 375 (1886); U.S. Dept. of the Interior, 
Federal Indian Law 24-33 (1958); see cases cited supra note 15. 
37- Congress has shifted jurisdiction over major crimes, such as murder, man-
slaughter, rape, arson, burglary, etc., from the tribal courts to the 
federal district courts by statute (l8 U.S.C. 1153), but the tribal courts 
retain jurisdiction over lesser offenses and generally, in civil actions 
between Indians. The scope of Tribal self-government is summarized in 
U.S. Dept. of the Interior, Federal Indian Law 395 (1958) as including the 
power: 
to define conditions of tribal numbership, to regulate 
domestic relations of members, to prescribe rules of inheritance, 
to levy taxes, to regulate property within the jurisdiction of the 
tribe, to control the conduct of members by municipal legislation, 
and to administer justice. 
38. Indian Reorganization Act of June 18, 1934, 48 Stat. 984, 25 U.S.C. 461-79* 
39. SUMMARY REPORT, at 24: "These denials (of constitutional rights )occur it 
is also apparent, not from malice or ill will, or from a desire to do unjus-
tice, but from the tribal judges' inexperience, lack of training, and un-
familiarity with the traditions and forms of the American legal system." 
CIVIL RIGHT'S REPORT, at 146: "Indian courts are said to render a good brand 
of justice except, perhaps, where offender require treatment rather than 
punishment, as in the case of many juvenile deliquents and some adults. 
Most Indian courts have neither the personnel nor the resources to cope 
with offenders of this sort. Report to the Secretary of the Interior by 
the Task Force on Indian Affairs 28 (July 14, 1961): 
The size and effectiveness of local forces of law and order are 
variable. Thus, the Navajo have a tribal court with seven judges, 
spend more than $1 million in tribal funds annually for law and order 
activities, equip their Indian police force with squad cars and two-way 
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radios, and have built modern and well-equipped jails which would be the 
envy of many countv sheriffs. But, at the other end of the scale, there 
are tribal courts .established in Indian country where, due to inadequate 
tribal funds, there is only one judge, untrained, no police force, and 
an outworn building for detention purposes. 
40. House Hearings, supra note 10, at 26; Reifel Statement, supra not 10; 
Remarks of Edward Weinberg, supra note 12, at 2, in describing the 
Interior Department's "selective" approach, which the Subcommittee adopted: 
"we were concerned that certain limitations placed by the Constitution 
upon the powers of the Federal Government, imposed upon tribal governments, 
would1 be disruptive of those governments out of all proportion to the 
protection they would afford individuals." See W. Brophy & S. Aberle, 
The Indian: AMERICA'S UNFINISHED BUSINESS (1966), and recommendation 
in the report to the Secretary of the Interior by the Task Force on Indian 
Affairs 31 (July 10, 1961). 
The Task Force is guided in thinking by the conviction that the 
protection of life and property, the preservation of civil rights, 
and the development of clearly defined civil and criminal codes is 
essential to rapid economic growth in the Indian country, and this, 
in turn, is fundamental to the rapid rise of the standard of living 
on the reservations which is necessary to Indian well-being. 
For the view that Title II weakened tribal sovereignty, on the other, 
see the Indian: The Forgotten American, 8l Harv. L. Rev. l8l8, 1822 (1968). 
41. SUMMARY REPORT at 25-26 
42. S. 1843 of the 90th Congress, reprinted at 113 Cong. Rec. S 7214 (daily ed. 
May 23, 1947). 
43. SENATE REPORT at 1-2, 14. 
44. SUMMARY REPORT at 13-14; Hearings, supra note 5, at 91. 
45. Act of Aug. 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. 1162 (1964), 28 U.S.C. 
1360 (1964). 
46. CIVIL RIGHTS REPORT, supra note 12, at 133: "Whether and to what extent 
such limitations (Bill of Rights restraints) are desirable involves (as 
in so many Indian Affairs) a delicate balancing of values - between civil 
rights and liberties on the one hand, and the benefits of tribal autonomy 
on the other." Compare 51 Va. L. Rev. 121 at 135 (1965). 
47. Endorsements of S. 1843 by numerous Indian tribes and Indian-interest 
organizations appear at 113 Cong. Rec. S 18157 et seq. (daily ed. Dec. 7, 
1967). In the final stages of the legislative process, only the more 
traditional Pueblo groups in New Mexico actually objected to Title II. 
House Hearings at 37 et. seq., Reifel Statement, supra note 10, at E. 2742. 
By contrast, representatives of many tribes opposed predecessor bills 
during the 1965 hearings of the Senate Subcommittee on Constitutional 
Rights. Hearings, supra note 5, passim. 
48. At least two cases have been instituted under the 1968 Act, one in the 
federal district court in Arizona to upset the eviction of the head of 
the OEO-supported Navajo legal service from the Navajo Reservation, and 
the second in the federal district court in Montana to change practices 
in the Blackfeet Tribal Court, but neither had progressed to final deci-
sion as of the date of this writing; in the former case, Judge Walter E. 
Craig on December 16, 1968 did deny defendant's motion to dismiss for 
lack of jurisdiction in part on the basis of Title II, Dodge v. Nakai, 
Civ. No.1209 Pet. 
49. The proposition that Title II is "selective" in making Indian tribes 
subject to constitutional restraints seems beyond dispute. SENATE 
REPORT at 10-11, SUMMARY REPORT at 25; Remarks of Edward Weinberg, supra 
note 12, at 1-3, Vol. VII, No. 5 ALBUQUERQUE L. J. 5-11 (1968); M. Price, 
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The Civil Rights Act of 1968: A11 Analysis for Discussion. Vol. 1, Ho. it-
Am. Indian L. Newsletter if- (May 24, 1968). The issue which the courts must 
face is what was selected in and what was selected out. 
Significantly, Title III of the 1968 Civil Rights Act, under which the 
Secretary of the Interior is directed to recommend to Congress "a model 
code to govern the administration of justice by courts of Indian offenses 
on Indian reservations," provides that such code shall assure that a 
criminal defendant "shall have the same rights, privileges, and immunities 
under the United States Constitution as would "be guaranteed any citizen 
of the United States being tried in a Federal court for any similar offense." 
Congress intended a difference between the two titles of the 1968 Act. 
Unlike tribal courts, which are run by the tribes, courts of Indian offenses 
are controlled by the Secretary. 25 C.F.R. 11.1. 
50. See W. Canby & W. Cohen, The Professional Attorney and the Civil Rights Act, 
Vol, 1, No. 28 Am. Indian L. Newsletter 7 (Dec. 16, 1968). 
51. United States v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 309 U.S. 506 (19U0) 
and cases therein cited; Maryland Casualty Co. v. Citizens Nat. Bank, 361 
F. 2d 517, 520 l4th Cir. 1966), cert, denied, 385 U.S. 918 (1966); Green 
v. Wilson, 331 F. 2d 769 (9th Cir. 196*0; Haile v. Saunooke, 2k6 F. 2d 293 
(4th 
Cir. 1957)? cert. Denied sub. nom. Haile v. Eastern Band of Cherokee 
Indians, 355, U.S. 93 (1957). 
52. 25 C.F.R. 2.3. 
53. 5 U.S.C. 702-06 (Supp. II 1966). If the ordianance under attack has long 
previously been approved by the Secretary, laches may defeat an administra-
tive or judgement appeal. In such cases, an action for a declaratory 
judgement would seem more appropriate., 28 U.S.C. 2201 (1964). But see 
Oliver v. Udall, supra note 25. 
54. Cf. Willjams v. Lee, 358 U.S. 217 (1969); Kain v. Wilson, - S.D. -, l6l 
N.W. 2d (1968). 
55. See Remarks of Edward Weinberg, supra note 12, at J: "This fact (tribal 
immunity from suit) would not seem to pose any particular problem to a 
suitor because he seemingly could proceed against the tribal officers 
responsible for the challenged action, ao individuals, under the familiar 
doctrine that the cloak of immunity does not cover officers whose acts 
are beyond their authority." But see Green v. Wilson, supra note 51-
56. Act of August 15, 1953, 67 Stat. 588, 18 U.S.C. 1162 (1964), 28 U.S.C. (1964). 
57- 28 U.S.C. 1331; (1964) granting jurisdiction to the District Courts where 
an issue arises under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United 
States. Under the Act of October 10, 1966, 80 Stat. 880, 28 U.S.C. 1362 
(Supp. II 1966), the jurisdiction al amendment was dropped for suits invol-
ving a federal question brought by Indian tribes, but no such waiver exists 
for suits by individual Indians. 
58. Another potential statutory source for the review of tribal action in the 
light of Title II is 28 U.S.C. 1343 (1964), which provides in part; 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of any civil 
action authorized by law to be commenced by any person: 
(4) To recover damages or to secure equitable or other relief under 
any Act of Congress providing for the protection of Civil Rights . . . . 
The 1968 Civil Rights Act clearly qualifies as a law "for the protection 
of civil rights" but Title II on its face does not authorize the filing of 
any civil action and, therefore, the courts more probably than not will 
dismiss suits based upon 28 U.s.C. 1343 for lack of jurisdiction. 
59- If the Talton rule no longer is valid, and the Bill of Rights limits tribal 
action under the Constitution absolutely, then enactment of Title II becomes 
a grand, but empty gesture. 
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60. Citations supra note 12. 
61. Supra note 11. The Supreme Court never has ruled that a right to counsel 
exists in cases of petty offenses, the general area of tribal court criminal 
jurisdiction. 
62. 50 AM. Jr. Statutes 244, 429, (1944). 
63. Although a serious question exists as to whether non-Indians are within a 
tribe's jurisdiction as a matter of law, Congress obviously intended to 
establish "rights for all persons who may be subject to the jurisdiction 
of tribal governments, whether Indians or non-Indians." SUMMARY REPORT at 
10. In view of the actual text of section 202 (8), a question exists as to 
whether non-Indians are entitled to the process, or only to the equal pro-
tection of the law. 
64. Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186 (1962), Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964), 
Avery v. Midland County, 36 U.S.L.W. 4257 (April 2, 1968); but see Sailors 
v. Board of Educ., U.S. 105 (1967), and Dusch v. Davis, 387 U.S. 112 (1967). 
65. In conferring civil jurisdiction over Indian reservations within the state 
upon the New York courts. Congress specifically recognized and gave effect 
to "those tribal laws and customs which they (the Indians) desire to pre-
serve . . . ." Act of September 13, 1966. 64 Stat. 845, 25 U.S.C. 
253 (1964). 
66. Morris v. Hitchock, 194 U.S. 384 (1904), see Travelers' Insurance Co. v. 
Connecticut, 185 U.S. 364 (1902), Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 
301 U.S. (1937), Madden v. Kentucky, 309 U.S. 83 (1940). 
